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 Neutrinos & Non-proliferation in Europe 
Michel Cribier*  
APC, Paris 
CEA/Saclay, DAPNIA/SPP 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the United Nations agency in 
charge of the development of peaceful use of atomic energy. In particular IAEA is the 
verification authority of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To 
do that jobs inspections of civil nuclear installations and related facilities under safeguards 
agreements are made in more than 140 states. 
IAEA uses many different tools for these verifications, like neutron monitor, gamma 
spectroscopy, but also bookeeping of the isotopic composition at the fuel element level before 
and after their use in the nuclear power station. In particular it verifie that weapon-origin and 
other fissile materials that Russia and USA have released from their defense programmes are 
used for civil application.  
The existence of an antineutrino signal sensitive to the power and to the isotopic 
composition of a reactor core, as first proposed by Mikaelian et al. [Mik77] and as 
demonstrated by the Bugey [Dec95] and Rovno experiments, [Kli94], could provide a means 
to address certain safeguards applications. Thus the IAEA recently ask members states to 
make a feasibility study to determine whether antineutrino detection methods might provide 
practical safeguards tools for selected applications.  If this method proves to be useful, IAEA 
has the power to decide that any new nuclear power plants built has to include an antineutrino 
monitor. 
Within the Double Chooz collaboration, an experiment [Las06] mainly devoted to 
study the fundamental properties of neutrinos, we thought that we were in a good position to 
evaluate the interest of using antineutrino detection to remotely monitor nuclear power 
station. This effort in Europe, supplemented by the US effort [Ber06], will constitute the basic 
answer to IAEA of the neutrino community. 
                                                 
*
 On behalf of a collective work by S. Cormon, M. Fallot, H. Faust, T. Lasserre, A. 
Letourneau, D. Lhuillier, V. Sinev from DAPNIA, Subatech and ILL. 
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Figure 1 : The statistical distribution of the fission products resulting 
from the fission of the most important fissile nuclei 235U and 239Pu 
shows two humps, one centered around masses 100 and the other one 
centered around 135. The low mass hump is at higher mass in 239Pu 
fission than in 235U, resulting in different nuclei and decays. 
The high penetration power of antineutrinos and the detection capability might 
provide a means to make remote, non-intrusive measurements of plutonium content in 
reactors [Ber02]. The antineutrino flux and energy spectrum depends upon the thermal power 
and on the fissile isotopic composition of the reactor fuel. Indeed, when a heavy nuclei 
(Uranium, Plutonium) experience a fission, it produce two unequal fission fragments (and a 
few free neutrons) ; the statistical distribution of the atomic masses is depicted in figure 1. All 
these nuclei immediately produced are extremely unstable - they are too rich in neutrons - and 
thus ß decay toward stable nuclei with an average of 6 ß decays. All these process involving 
several hundreds of unstable nuclei, with their excited states, makes very difficult to 
understand details of the physics, moreover, the most energetic antineutrinos, which are 
detected more easily, are produced in the very first decays, involving nuclei with typical 
lifetime smaller than a second. 
 
235U 239Pu 
released energy per fission 201.7 MeV 210.0 MeV 
Mean energy of ν 2.94 MeV 2.84 MeV 
ν per fission > 1.8 MeV 1.92 1.45 
average inter. cross section ≈ 3.2 10
-43
 
cm2 
≈ 2.76 10-43 
cm2 
Based on predicted and observed ß spectra, the number of antineutrinos per fission 
from 239Pu is known to be less than the number from 235U, and the energy released bigger by 
5%. Hence an hypothetical reactor able to use only 235U would induce in a detector an 
antineutrino signal 60% higher than the same reactor producing the same amount of energy 
but burning only 239Pu (see table). This offers a means to monitor changes in the relative 
amount of 235U and 239Pu in the core. If made in conjunction with accurate independent 
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measurements of the thermal power (with the temperature and the flow rate of cooling water), 
antineutrino measurements might provide an estimate of the isotopic composition of the core, 
in particular its plutonium inventories. The shape of the antineutrino spectrum can provide 
additional information about core fissile isotopic composition.  
Because the antineutrino signal from the reactor decreases as the square of the 
distance from the reactor to the detector a precise "remote" measurement is really only 
practical at distances of a few tens of meters if one is constrained to "small" detectors of the 
order of few cubic meter in size. 
Simulations 
MAGNITUDES OF SOME EFFECTS 
In our group, the development of detailed simulations using professional reactor 
codes started (see below), but it seems wise to use less sophisticated methods in order to 
evaluate already, with some flexibility, the magnitude of some effects. To do that we started 
from the set of Bateman equations, as depicted graphicaly in figure 2, which discribed the 
evolution of fuel elements in a reactor. The gross simplification in such treatment is the use of 
average cross section, depending only on 3 groups (thermal neutron, resonance region, fast 
neutrons), and moreover the fact that the neutron flux is imposed and not calculated. 
 
Figure 2 : The Bateman equations are the set of differential equations which described 
all transformations of the nuclei submitted to a given neutron flux : capture of 
neutrons are responsible to move at Z constant (green arrow), ß-decay are 
responsible to increase the atomic mass by one unit (dark blue arrow), and fission 
destroy the heavy nuclei and produce energy (orange arrows). 
Given this we use for each isotope under consideration, the cross section for capture, 
fission, and also plug in the parameters of the decays. Then it is rather easy (and fast) to 
simulate the evolution of a given initial core composition ; in the same way, it is possible to 
« make a diversion » by manipulation the fuel composition at a choosen moment. As an 
example, the figure 3 show the evolution of a fresh core composed of Uranium enriched at 3.5 
% in 235U : the build up of 239Pu and 241Pu is rather well reproduced. 
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Figure 3 : In a new reactor the initial fuel consist of enriched uranium rods, with 
an 
235U content typically at 3.5 %, the rest is 238U. As soon as the reactor is 
operating, reactions described by Bateman equations produce 239Pu (and 241Pu), 
which then participate to the energy production, at the expense of 238U. 
Knowing the amount of fissions at a given time, it is straight forward to translate that 
in a given antineutrino flux using the parametrisation of [Hub04], and finally using the 
interaction cross section for inverse ß decay reaction, to produce the recorded signal in a given 
detector placed at a suitable location from the reactor under examination. 
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Figure 4 : Positron spectrum recorded in an typical antineutrino detector (10 tons of 
target) placed at 150m of a nuclear reactor (1000 MWel). Positrons results from the 
inverse ß-decay reaction used in the detection of anti-neutrino. The signal is the 
superposition of several component whose spectrum exhibit small but sizeable 
differences, especialy at high energy. 
As an example of this type of computation, we show in figure 5, the effect of the 
modification of fuel composition after 100 days : here the operator, clever enough, knows that 
he cannot merely remove Plutonium from the core without changing the thermal power which 
will be immediatly noticed. Hence he takes the precaution to add 28 kg of 235U at the same 
time where he remove 20 kg of 239Pu : although the thermal power is kept constant, the 
imprint on the antineutrino signal, although modest, is such that, after 10 days, there is an 
increase of more than 1 σ in the number of interactions recorded. Such a diversion is clearly 
impossible in PWR or BWR, but more easy in Candu-type reactor, and even more in a molten 
salt reactor. 
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Figure 5 : An hypothetical diversion scenario where an exchange of 239Pu with 
235U is made such that the power does not change, but the antineutrino signal 
recorded by the monitor is slightly increased, giving some evidence of an 
abnormal operation. 
SIMULATIONS OF DIVERSION SCENARIOS 
The IAEA recommends the study of specific safeguards scenarios. Among its 
concerns are the confirmation of the absence of unrecorded production of fissile material in 
declared reactors and the monitoring of the burn-up of a reactor core. The time required to 
manufacture an actual weapon estimated by the IAEA (conversion time), for plutonium in 
partially irradiated or spent fuel, lies between 1 and 3 months. The significant quantity of Pu 
is 8 kg, to be compared with the 3 tons of 235U contained in a Pressurized Water Reactor 
(PWR) of power 900MWe enriched to 3%. The small magnitude of the researched signal 
requires a carefull feasability study.  
The proliferation scenarios of interest involve different kinds of nuclear power plants 
such as light water or heavy water reactors (PWR, BWR, Candu...), it has to include isotope 
production reactors of a few tens of MWth, and future reactors (e.g., PBMRs, Gen IV 
reactors, accelerator-driven sub-critical assemblies for transmutation, molten salt reactors). To 
perform these studies, core simulations with dedicated Monte-Carlo codes should be 
provided, coupled to the simulation of the evolution of the antineutrino flux and spectrum 
over time. 
We started a simulation work using the widely used particle transport code MCNPX 
[Mcn05], coupled with an evolution code solving the Bateman equations for the fission 
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products within a package called MURE (MCNP Utility for Reactor Evolution) [Mur05]. This 
package offers a set of tools, interfaced with MCNP or MCNPX, that allows to define easily 
the geometry of a reactor core. In the evolution part, it accesses, the set of evaluated nuclear 
data and cross sections. MURE is perfectly adapted to simulate the evolution with time of the 
composition of the fuel, taking into account the neutronics of a reactor core. We are adapting 
the evolution code to simulate the antineutrino spectrum and flux, using simple Fermi decay 
as starting point.  
The extended MURE simulation will allows to perform sensitivity studies by varying 
the Pu content of the core in the relevant scenarios for IAEA. By varying the reactor power, 
the possibility to use antineutrinos for power monitoring can be evaluated. 
Preliminary results show that nuclei with half-lives lower than 1s emit about 70% 
(50%) of the 235U( 239Pu) antineutrino spectrum above 6 MeV. The high energy part of the 
spectrum is the energy region where Pu and U spectra differ mostly. The influence of the ß 
decay of these nuclei on the antineutrino spectrum might be preponderant also in scenarios 
where rapid changes of the core composition are performed, e.g. in reactors such as Candu, 
refueled on line. 
The appropriate starting point for this scenario is a representative PWR, like the 
Chooz reactors. For this reactor type, simulations of the evolution of the antineutrino flux and 
spectrum over time will be provided and compared to the accurate measurement provided by 
the near detector of Double Chooz. This should tell the precision on the fuel composition and 
of an independent thermal power measurements. An interesting point to study is at the time of 
the partial refuelling of the core, thanks to the fact that reactors like Chooz (N4-type) does not 
use MOX fuel. 
Without any extra experimental effort, the near detector of the Double Chooz 
experiment will provide the most important dataset of anti neutrino detected (5x105 ν per 
year) by a PWR. The precise neutrino energy spectrum recorded at a given time will be 
correlated to the fuel composition and to the thermal power provided by EDF. This valuable 
dataset will constitute an excellent experimental basis for the above feasibility studies of 
potential monitoring and for bench-marking fuel management codes ; it is expected that 
individual component due to fissile element (235U, 239Pu) could be extracted with some 
modest precision and serve as a benchmark of this techniques. 
To fulfil the goal of non-proliferation additional lab tests and theoretical calculations 
should also be performed to more precisely estimate the underlying neutrino spectra of 
plutonium and uranium fission products, especially at high energies. Contributions of decays 
to excited states of daughter nuclei are mandatory to reconstruct the shape of each spectrum. 
Following the conclusion of P. Huber and Th. Schwetz [Hub04] to achieve this goal a 
reduction of the present errors on the anti-neutrino fluxes of about a factor of three is 
necessary. We will see that such improvement needs an important effort. 
Experimental effort  
The precise measurement of β-decay spectra from fission products produced by the 
irradiation of a fissile target can be performed at the high flux reactor at Institut Laue 
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Langevin (ILL) in Grenoble, where similar studies performed in the past [Sch85] are the basis 
of the actual fluxes of antineutrinos used in these reactor neutrino experiment. The ILL 
reactor produces the highest neutron flux in the world : the fission rate of a fissile material 
target placed close to the reactor core is about 1012 per second. It is possible to choose 
different fissile elements as target in order to maximize the yield of the nucleus of interest. 
Using the LOHENGRIN recoil mass spectrometer [Loh04], measurement of individual 
β−spectra from short lived fission products are possible ; in the same irradiation channel, 
measurements of integral ß-spectrum with the Mini-INCA detectors [Mar06], could be 
envisaged to perform study on the evolution with time of the antineutrino energy spectrum of 
a nuclear power plant. 
EXPERIMENTS WITH LOHENGRIN 
The LOHENGRIN recoil mass spectrometer offers the possibility to measure β-
decays of individual fission products. The fissile target (235U, 239Pu, 241Pu, …) is placed into a 
thermal neutron flux of 6.1014 n/cm2/s, 50 cm from the fuel element. Recoil fission products 
are selected with a dipolar magnetic field followed by an electrostatic condenser. At the end 
the fragments could be implanted in a moving tape, and the measurement of subsequent β and 
γ-rays are recorded by a β-spectrometer (Si-detector) and Ge-clover detectors, respectively. 
Coincidences between these two quantities could also be made to reconstruct the decay 
scheme of the observed fission products or to select one fission product. Fragments with half-
lives down to 2 µs can be measured, so that nuclei with large Qß (above 4 MeV) can be 
measured.  
The LOHENGRIN experimental objectives are to complete existing β-spectra of 
individual fission products [Ten89] with new measurements for the main contributors to the 
detected ν-spectra and to clarify experimental disagreements between previous measurements. 
This ambitious experimental programme is motivated by the fact - noted by C. Bemporad 
[Bem02] - that unknown decays contribute as much as 25% of the antineutrinos at energies > 
4MeV. Folding the antineutrino energy spectrum over the detection cross-section for inverse 
beta decay enhances the contribution of the high energy antineutrinos to the total detected flux 
by a factor of about 10 for Eν > 6 MeV. The focus of these experiments will be on neutron 
rich nuclei with yields very different in 239Pu and 235U fission. In the list : 86Ge,90-92Se, 94Br, 
96-98Kr, 100Rb, 100-102Sr, 108-112Mo, 106-113Tc,113-115Ru…contribute to the high energy part of the 
spectrum and have never been measured. 
IRRADIATION TESTS IN SUMMER 2005 
A test-experiment has been performed during two weeks last in summer 2005. The 
isobaric chains A=90 and A=94 were studied where some isotopes possess a high Qß energy, 
contributing significantly to the high energy part of the antineutrino spectra following 235U 
and 239Pu fissions and moreover produced with very different fission yields after 235U and 
239Pu fission [Eng94]. The well-known nuclei, such as 90Br, will serve as a test of the 
experimental set-up, while the beta decay of more exotic nuclei such as 94Kr and 94Br will 
constitute a test case for how far one can reach in the very neutron rich region with this 
experimental device. The recorded data (figure 6) will validate the simulation described in the 
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previous section, in particular the evolution over time of the isobaric chains beta decay 
spectra. 
Silicon detector
Germanium detector
 
Figures 6 : Beta energy spectrum (6a) recorded with the silicon detector 
corresponding to ß decay of fission products with mass A=94. The fission 
products arising from the LOHENGRIN spectrometer were implanted on a mylar 
tape of adjustable velocity in front of the silicon detector. The highest velocity was 
selected in order to enhance shorter-lived nuclei such as 94Kr and 94Br. The 
gamma energy spectrum (6b) obtained with the germanium detector 
corresponding and to the same runs is displayed also. 
INTEGRAL ß SPECTRA MEASUREMENTS 
In complement to individual studies on LOHENGRIN, more integral studies can be 
envisaged using the so called “Mini-INCA chamber” at ILL [Mar06] in return for adding a β-
spectrometer (to be developped). The existing α- and γ-spectroscopy station is connected to 
the LOHENGRIN channel and offers the possibility to perform irradiations in a quasi thermal 
neutron flux up to 20 times the nominal value in a PWR. Moreover, the irradiation can be 
repeated as many time as needed. It offers then the unique possibility to characterize the 
evolution of the ß spectrum as a function of the irradiation time and the irradiation cooling. 
The expected modification of the β spectrum as a function of the irradiation time is connected 
to the transmutation induced by neutron capture of the fissile and fission fragment elements. It 
is thus related to the “natural” evolution of the spent-fuel in the reactor. The modification of 
the β spectrum as a function of the cooling time is connected to the decaying chain of the 
fission products and is then a means to select the emitted fragments by their livetime. This 
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information is important because long-lived fission fragments accumulate in the core and after 
few days mainly contribute to the low energy part of the antineutrino-spectra. 
Due to the mechanical transfer of the sample from the irradiation location to the 
measurement station an irreducible delay time of 30 mn is imposed leading to the loss of 
short-live fragments. 
PROSPECT TO STUDY FISSION OF 238U 
The integral beta decay spectrum arising from 238U fission has never been measured. 
All information relies on theoretical computations [Vog89]. Some experiments could be  
envisaged using few MeV neutron sources in Europe (Van de Graaf in Geel, SINQ in PSI, 
ALVARES or SAMES accelerators at Valduc, …). Here the total absence of experimental 
data on the ß emitted in the fission of 238U change the context of this measurement compared 
to the other isotopes. Indeed any integral measurements performed could be used to constraint 
the present theoretical estimations of the antineutrino flux produced in the fission of 238U. In 
any case it seems rather difficult to fulfil the goal of a determination of the isotopic content 
from antineutrinos measurements as long as in important part of the energy spectrum is so 
poorly known. 
Conclusions 
After the preliminary studies, some thoughts can already be made. A realistic 
diversion (≈ 10 kg Pu) has an imprint in the antineutrino signal which is very small. The 
present knowledge on antineutrino spectrum emitted in fissions is not precise enough to allow 
a determination of the isotopic content in the core sensitive to such diversion. 
On the other hand, the thermal power measurement is a less difficult job. Neutrinos 
sample the whole core, without attenuation, and would bring valuable information on the 
power with totally different systematics than present methods. 
Even if its measurement is not dissuasive by itself, the operator cannot hide any stops 
or change of power, and in most case, such a record made with an external and independent 
device, virtually impossible to fake, will act as a strong constraint. 
In spite of the uncertainty mentioned previously, we see that the most energetic part 
offers the best possibility to disentangle fission from 235U and 239Pu. The comparison between 
the cumulative numbers of antineutrinos as a function of antineutrino energy detected at low 
vs. high energy is an efficient observable to distinguish pure 235U and 239Pu. 
IAEA seeks also monitoring large spent-fuel elements. For this application, the 
likelihood is that antineutrino detectors could only make measurements on large quantities of 
beta-emitters, e.g., several cores of spent fuel. In the time of the experiment the discharge of 
parts of the core will happen and the Double-Chooz experiment will quantify the sensitivity of 
such monitoring. 
More generally the techniques developed for the detection of antineutrinos could be 
applied for the monitoring of nuclear activities at the level of a country. Hence a KamLAND 
type detector deeply submerged off the coast of the country, would offer the sensitivity to 
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detect a new underground reactor located at several hundreds of kilometers. All these 
common efforts toward more reliable techniques, remotely operated detectors, not to mention 
undersea techniques will automatically benefit to both fields, safeguard and geo-neutrinos. 
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